\u3cem\u3eCaremark\u3c/em\u3e and Compliance: A Twenty Year Lookback by Langevoort, Donald C
Georgetown University Law Center 
Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW 
2018 
Caremark and Compliance: A Twenty Year Lookback 
Donald C. Langevoort 
Georgetown University Law Center, langevdc@law.georgetown.edu 
 
 
This paper can be downloaded free of charge from: 
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/2040 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3135950 
 
90 Temple L. Rev. 727-742 (2018) 
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub 
  
 
727 
COMMENTARY 
CAREMARK AND COMPLIANCE: A TWENTY-YEAR 
LOOKBACK 
Donald C. Langevoort* 
ABSTRACT 
The Delaware Chancery Court’s decision in In re Caremark was and is a 
landmark decision. This brief Commentary takes a look back at Caremark on 
three issues that pertain to its contemporary relevance inside the corporate 
boardroom: (1) framing the cost-benefit assessment on the question of how much 
to spend on compliance; (2) how and when to force certain compliance matters to 
real-time board-level attention; and (3) using selection, promotion, and 
compensation decisions to influence the culture and risk-taking “temperature” of 
the firm. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In nearly all narratives of how compliance has grown as a legal subject and 
field of practice in the last two decades, the Delaware Chancery Court’s decision 
in In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation1 plays a featured role.2 
 
*  Thomas Aquinas Reynolds Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. 
1.  698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). Caremark was endorsed by the Delaware Supreme Court a 
decade later in Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006), which obviously became the more 
authoritative citation. Nonetheless, Caremark is the standard label in the literature and Delaware case 
law, and so I will use it here. On extensions and limitations in the Caremark approach for risk 
management beyond legal compliance, see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Caremark and Enterprise Risk 
Management, 34 J. CORP. L. 967, 985–90 (2009).  
2.  See, e.g., GEOFFREY PARSONS MILLER, THE LAW OF GOVERNANCE, RISK MANAGEMENT, 
AND COMPLIANCE 55–61 (2014); John H. Walsh, A History of Compliance, in MODERN COMPLIANCE: 
BEST PRACTICES FOR SECURITIES & FINANCE 5, 29–30 (David H. Lui & John H. Walsh eds., 2015) 
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Chancellor William T. Allen’s opinion predicted the abandonment of the 
Delaware Supreme Court’s older and heavily criticized approach in Graham v. 
Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co.,3 which had limited the board of directors’ 
compliance oversight obligation to situations where red flags were waving in the 
board’s face.4 It said (though entirely in dicta) that the board had an affirmative 
obligation to assure itself in good faith that the corporation had a system of 
internal reporting and compliance controls to monitor for illegal activities.5 Since 
that time, compliance has grown in size, scope, and stature at nearly all large 
corporations.6 
There is a lively academic debate over whether Caremark’s causal impact 
on the unmistakable growth curve of compliance has been overstated.7 After all, 
the holding in the decision (approving a de minimis settlement) was that the 
standard for holding directors of Delaware corporations liable for monetary 
damages under a test requiring “sustained or systematic failure . . . to exercise 
oversight” would be exceedingly hard for plaintiffs to prove, which is not a 
particularly threatening message.8 Plus, federal law had already been trending 
strongly in the direction of a robust corporate compliance obligation in many 
disparate fields of regulation (for example, antitrust, financial services, 
healthcare, and defense contracting) and—as Caremark duly noted9—the 
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines had made the presence and quality of 
compliance (including board oversight) a substantial factor in the size and 
severity of any federal penalty for criminal wrongdoing.10 Within a few years 
would come even bigger waves of pressure from Washington, via the emergence 
of deferred prosecution agreements, corporate charging decisions, and—for 
public companies—the mandates of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.11 This required 
new board structures, internal control processes, and whistleblower protections 
 
(describing Caremark and its early influence).  
3.  188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963). Famously, the court rejected the idea that boards were obliged to 
install a corporate system of “espionage” to spy on employee behavior. Graham, 188 A.2d at 130.  
4.  Id. at 130. 
5.  Id. 
6.  See Miriam Hechler Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REV. 949, 949–51 
(2009); Sean J. Griffith, Corporate Governance in an Age of Compliance, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
2075, 2077 (2016).  
7.  See Mercer Bullard, Caremark’s Irrelevance, 10 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 15, 19 (2013). Similarly, 
Jennifer Arlen says that Caremark failed to nudge boards sufficiently to make a difference and that it 
took the accumulation of federal initiatives to make compliance a higher corporate priority. See 
Jennifer Arlen, The Story of Allis-Chalmers, Caremark, and Stone: Directors’ Evolving Duty to 
Monitor, in CORPORATE LAW STORIES 323, 324–25 (J. Mark Ramseyer ed., 2009). 
8.  In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
9.  Id. at 969. 
10.  See, e.g., Dan K. Webb & Steven F. Molo, Some Practical Considerations in Developing 
Effective Compliance Programs: A Framework for Meeting the Requirements of the Sentencing 
Guidelines, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 375, 378–79 (1993).  
11.  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
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to address the risk of financial misreporting,12 which arises in the face of any 
material corporate wrongdoing.13 
Whatever its causality, Caremark no doubt did in its time focus the 
attention of elite corporate lawyers, who used their considerable influence inside 
the boardroom to grab the attention of directors and insist on more rigorous 
internal procedures.14 As has happened with other seminal “message” 
opinions,15 the lawyers probably trumpeted the dicta and subtly downplayed 
how tiny the remaining liability risk was in order to upgrade compliance (a legal 
function) as a corporate priority. It would be no surprise, then, if directors came 
to believe that the Caremark threat was greater than the actual holding 
indicated. 
But we need not obsess over history. Caremark is at the very least a label 
attached to what all now agree is a necessary and proper subject of attention for 
every board of directors: corporate compliance as a function within the broader 
task of enterprise risk management. In this brief Commentary, I want to address 
some lingering issues that flow out of Caremark, touching on the nature and 
design of compliance programs and the role of the board therein. None of this is 
meant to be critical of Chancellor Allen or the opinion he authored, but rather to 
identify ways in which what was said back then no longer suffices to address the 
contemporary milieu of aggressive compliance. 
As many corporate governance scholars have come to accept, corporations 
are complex interactive systems of processes, routines, and feedback, the efficacy 
of which cannot be taken for granted and hence becomes the crucial focus of the 
CEO and senior management team.16 The overwhelming complexity is 
daunting—perhaps beyond even the collective brainpower of the C-suite to 
comprehend—yet can and must be managed to the extent possible. Like all 
enterprise risks, compliance risks emerge, move, and change in ways not always 
visible within the architectural sight lines of the firm. 
It is at least arguable that independent directors do not have the capacity to 
engage with this complexity, so that Caremark was wise to demand almost 
 
12.  Id. 
13.  See, e.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Appeal and Limits of Internal Controls to Fight 
Fraud, Terrorism, Other Ills, 29 J. CORP. L. 267, 268–72 (2004).  
14.  See Hillary A. Sale, Monitoring Caremark’s Good Faith, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 719, 720 (2007).  
15.  See Walsh, supra note 2, at 30 (quoting lawyers about their advice to boards shortly after 
Caremark); Roundtable: The Legacy of Smith v. Van Gorkom, DIRECTORS & BOARDS, Spring 2000, at 
28, 32–37 (remarks of Ira Millstein); cf. Donald C. Langevoort & Robert K. Rasmussen, Skewing the 
Results: The Role of Lawyers in Transmitting Legal Rules, 5 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L. J. 375, 416 (1997) 
(arguing that lawyers gain power vis-à-vis their clients in proportion to the seriousness of the legal 
threat perceived by the client).  
16.  A relatively early expression of this is ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW (1986), 
especially Section 3.4.2 and Appendix A. See also Donald C. Langevoort, Internal Controls After 
Sarbanes-Oxley: Revisiting Corporate Law’s “Duty of Care as Responsibility for Systems”, 31 J. CORP. 
L. 949, 950–52 (2006); Timothy F. Malloy, Regulation, Compliance and the Firm, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 451, 
459 (2003). More recently, the systems approach has been applied to help define a corporation’s legal 
purpose in Tamara Belinfanti & Lynn Stout, Contested Visions: The Value of Systems Theory for 
Corporate Law, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 579 (2018).  
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nothing beyond asking that some compliance system exists. Independent boards 
have limited time, attention, and expertise, which should thus be deployed only 
when and where most useful. Yet government enforcers and standard setters 
today insist on a much greater board role without necessarily defining how or 
why it will be constructive. The remaining sections of my Commentary address 
three possibilities: (1) framing the cost-benefit assessment on the question of 
how much to spend on compliance; (2) forcing certain compliance matters to 
real-time board-level attention; and (3) using selection, promotion, and 
compensation decisions to influence the culture and risk-taking “temperature” of 
the firm. None of these is unfamiliar as a subject within the now vast literature 
on compliance, but I think there are still points and perspectives as to each that 
both connect back to Caremark and deserve more attention. 
I. WAS CAREMARK MISLEADING?: TRADEOFFS AND EXTERNALITIES 
For all the progress that has been made in both scholarly research and 
practitioner sophistication about compliance, quantitative metrics that help 
answer the basic questions—how much in the way of corporate resources should 
be devoted to compliance and how should those resources best be deployed—are 
elusive. Within the corporate control system, feedback with respect to high-level 
risk events is (fortunately) not frequent enough to calibrate with precision. To be 
sure, a brokerage firm, for example, can use changes in the number of regulatory 
inquires and customer complaints as indicators that compliance strategies are 
working or not, but these numbers can vary for any number of reasons and do 
not necessarily capture larger, less frequent risks. Similarly, surveys and other 
measurement tools regarding “ethical climate” can be helpful but leave open the 
question of what, precisely, to do about any dark clouds.17 Put simply, there is 
always more that can be done in compliance—especially in the technology and 
manpower for audit and surveillance18—and an unavoidable fear that should a 
legal catastrophe happen, enforcers and the media will conclude in hindsight that 
what was done was not enough. On the other hand, compliance is not a profit 
center, making it hard to compete for funding with corporate functions that are, 
especially when the focus is on the short term. 
Caremark was quite clear that these resources and deployment choices are 
matters of business judgment, and hence receive strong deference when made in 
good faith.19 This plays into the minimalist board role—from this perspective, it 
suffices that management present its compliance plan for board-level feedback 
and/or approval on a regular basis. A claim by management that additional 
expenditures would not be cost-justified in light of its subjective risk assessment 
 
17.  See Donald C. Langevoort, Cultures of Compliance, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 933, 970–71 
(2017) [hereinafter Langevoort, Cultures of Compliance].  
18.  For an interesting set of thoughts about technology and the costs of compliance, see William 
S. Laufer, A Very Special Regulatory Milestone (Univ. of Pa., Dep’t of Criminology, Working Paper 
No. 2017-4.0, 2017), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3034699 [perma: 
http://perma.cc/A7WM-RVVL].  
19.  See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967–68 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
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is presumptively reliable, all the more so if buttressed by an independent 
consultant’s report.20 Given the complexity of the compliance system (embedded 
inside the even more complicated corporate operating system), these resource 
allocations are hard for board members to question. Caremark certainly gives 
them no reason to do so. 
The court’s teaching that compliance is a matter of business judgment, 
however, can easily be misleading.21 It suggests that the cost-benefit tradeoffs are 
made by reference to the long-run best interests of the corporation and its 
shareholders, so that the answer to the question “how much compliance is 
enough” is when the costs to the corporation exceed the benefits to it in terms of 
reduction in perceived risk. Indeed, that is conventional Delaware corporate 
law.22 This is not to say that the board has the right to authorize illegal behavior 
because it is likely to be profitable—intentional illegality is ultra vires and 
outside the protection of the business judgment rule.23 But Caremark was 
assuming the situation where there is no contemporaneous knowledge much less 
approval of criminality at the board level, so that the lawsuit is simply about 
efficient monitoring from a corporate (that is, shareholder) wealth perspective. 
As Geoffrey Miller has demonstrated, such stress on business judgment is 
troubling. From a regulator’s or enforcer’s perspective, the goal of a compliance 
obligation is to cause corporations to invest in compliance up to the level where 
the preventive costs equal the social harm caused by the wrongdoing, not the 
harm to the corporation from being caught.24 Their judgment as to the adequacy 
of expenditures (or compliance efforts as a whole) should thus be designed to 
penalize firms that underinvest in legal precaution from a social risk perspective, 
even if the judgment might be reasonable in terms of expected shareholder 
value. 
To illustrate, consider the portion of a compliance program focused on 
foreign bribery as interdicted by the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 
(FCPA).25 FCPA compliance is challenging, to be sure—the law is murky at 
numerous points, regulators vary over time in the likelihood and severity of 
enforcement, and the points of legal risk (opportunities for potentially unlawful 
payments) are numerous. From a shareholder perspective, the risk of sanction 
has to be taken very seriously, but so do the potential costs. And there is strong 
evidence that, on average and over time, FCPA sanctions are significantly less 
 
20.  See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 371–72 (Del. 2006) (giving weight to consultant’s report 
on bank’s anti-money laundering compliance efforts). 
21.  See Bullard, supra note 7, at 20–24.  
22.  E.g., Ebay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 35 (Del. Ch. 2010) (stating the 
maximization of long term wealth of the corporation as only legitimate business objective). 
23.  See John C. Coffee, Jr., Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of 
Corporate Misconduct and an Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REV. 1099, 1172–73 (1977) 
[hereinafter Coffee, Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry].  
24.  See Geoffrey P. Miller, An Economic Analysis of Effective Compliance Programs, in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE CRIME AND FINANCIAL MISDEALING 247, 254–55 (Jennifer 
Arlen et al. eds., 2018); see also Langevoort, Cultures of Compliance, supra note 17, at 937–39. 
25.  See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3 (2012). 
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than the money to be made when violations remain undetected.26 So even 
though a board could not authorize or knowingly tolerate violations, it could 
under Caremark choose to follow management’s preference for moderation in 
how the firm deals with FCPA risks, without fear of state law fiduciary duty 
liability. 
 All that changes, however, when we move from state law fiduciary duties to 
federal or state regulatory enforcement.27 If a violation occurs and is detected, 
the company may face increased sanctions if business judgment led it to invest 
suboptimally in precaution. True, regulators and enforcers may err in their own 
assessment of the cost-benefit tradeoffs, ignoring a multitude of indirect costs 
and adopting a motivationally inflated view of benefits. Jennifer Arlen and 
Marcel Kahan, for example, warn against regulators straying too far from the 
norm of corporate efficiency in making judgments about compliance,28 and their 
fears about institutional competence are reasonable. My impression is that 
prosecutors have shown some naïveté in their faith in particular compliance and 
governance strategies. But in principle, at least, regulators and enforcers who 
have prosecutorial discretion and the ability to seek compliance-related sanction 
adjustment have no reason to feel beholden to Caremark’s focus on corporate 
well-being, and almost surely do not in fact.29 
Instead, they will be looking to see a more active board-level engagement 
that accepts that compliance is not simply a matter of looking out for the best 
interests of the firm. This idea helps frame the kind of conversation that should 
occur between management and the board. Credit for good compliance comes 
when those in control of the company accept responsibility for the social harms 
that come from wrongdoing and seek to identify and avoid them by all 
reasonable means. To be clear, this is not an expectation that the board should 
abandon its fiduciary responsibilities, but rather that it should recognize the 
variable nature of the threat to the firm from poor compliance: a more severe 
sanction that, rationally, justifies a higher level of precaution. 
Of course, one might argue that management should understand this on its 
own and take the (socially) optimal compliance precautions in the firm’s best 
interests. But there are at least two sets of concerns to make us worry about 
excessive managerial autonomy regarding compliance strictures, both now fairly 
 
26.  See Jonathan M. Karpoff et al., Foreign Bribery: Incentives and Enforcement 3 (Apr. 7, 
2017) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1573222 [perma: 
http://perma.cc/G75K-S8JZ].  
27.  Once regulators start focusing on compliance, their standards soon become de facto 
requirements, if not de jure ones. See, e.g., Bullard, supra note 7, at 27–38. Bullard focuses on health 
care as an example of federal preemption of compliance, but the same point can be made about many 
other regulatory domains. Id.  
28.  See Jennifer Arlen & Marcel Kahan, Corporate Governance Regulation Through 
Nonprosecution, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 323, 327–28 (2017) (limiting compliance-related interventions to 
wrongdoing indicating clear agency cost problems); see also Lawrence A. Cunningham, Deferred 
Prosecutions and Corporate Governance: An Integrated Approach to Investigation and Reform, 66 FLA. 
L. REV. 1, 50–56 (2014) [hereinafter Cunningham, Deferred Prosecutions]; Griffith, supra note 6, at 
2105–06. 
29.  See Langevoort, Cultures of Compliance, supra note 17, at 937–40.  
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familiar. One is the presence of agency costs. For reasons having to do with 
hiring, compensation, and retention incentives, executives face a cost-benefit 
calculus for legal risk-taking that differs from the long-run best interest of the 
firm. They may choose a strategy that creates risk of sanction for the company in 
order to keep their jobs and perquisites.30 But the same kinds of pressures to 
cheat may also arise from an excessive commitment to the firm’s best interests, as 
where a cover-up is launched to avoid legal responsibility for something that has 
gone wrong or to avoid loan defaults and the like that would occur if the hidden 
problems were revealed. I (and others) have written extensively about what 
motivates managerial misbehavior, and this vast debate need not be repeated 
here.31 Suffice it to say that managerial motivations toward legal compliance are 
not fully aligned with either the corporation’s best interests or the optimal 
avoidance of social harm. Regulators’ hopes thus turn to the board of directors. 
How well boards do here is open to question, given informational 
imbalances and the boards’ own skewed incentive structure.32 But some agenda 
items for active discussion seem obvious. Today, especially, clawback provisions 
in executive compensation packages are seen as an important risk-reducing 
device, as to compliance and otherwise.33 To design an optimal clawback 
requires careful consideration of the compliance risk environment and the 
pressures that may motivate conscious or unconscious cheating behaviors. That 
exercise itself is a valuable one, and should not be bottled up just in the work of 
the compensation committee of the board. 
We will turn to other things for boards to think about shortly. For now, I 
would simply suggest that compliance oversight requires seeing how easily 
management’s internal perspective can undervalue (and undermine) a truly 
potent compliance structure, turning it into cosmetic compliance.34 The board 
that wants full compliance credit if and when a violation occurs had better be 
able to demonstrate awareness and response, and not simply wave the flag of 
“business judgment.” 
So, what about Caremark? The foregoing discussion and what is yet to come 
go well beyond the holdings and dicta in Caremark and its Delaware corporate 
law progeny. To be sure, dicta found in the opinion is meant to prompt some 
 
30.  Because of diffusion of knowledge and responsibility within complex firms, individual 
prosecutions are less frequent, though by no means unlikely. My view, developed at length elsewhere, 
is that psychology and culture make executives willing to engage in or tolerate noncompliance even 
when rationally it might be prudent to obey the law. See DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SELLING HOPE, 
SELLING RISK: CORPORATIONS, WALL STREET, AND THE DILEMMAS OF INVESTOR PROTECTION 33–
60 (2016).  
31.  Id.; see also, e.g., Arlen & Kahan, supra note 32; Coffee, Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry, supra 
note 23. 
32.  See LANGEVOORT, supra note 30, at 90–91.  
33.  See generally Jesse Fried & Nitzan Shilon, Excess-Pay Clawbacks, 36 J. CORP. L. 721 (2011) 
(detailing clawback provisions and discussing their prevalence).  
34.  See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 
81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487, 491 (2003) (“[A] growing body of evidence indicates that internal compliance 
structures do not deter prohibited conduct within firms, and may largely serve a window-dressing 
function that provides both market legitimacy and reduced legal liability.”).  
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attention to the status of internal compliance. But this is all by way of what in the 
end animates the Delaware corporate vision: it is up to the shareholders to elect 
directors who care about their interests and monitor accordingly. As Chancellor 
Allen says, there are limits on how sorry to feel for the shareholders if they fail 
to do so and some compliance catastrophe occurs.35 By contrast, the evolving 
regulatory vision of corporate compliance responsibilities is to see the harms 
from corporate wrongdoing to persons with no franchise at all. On that 
Caremark says naught, and thus seems a bit less relevant in modern optimal 
compliance debates. 
II. WAS CAREMARK NAÏVE?: BOARD KNOWLEDGE AND DISTORTED 
INFORMATION FLOW 
Caremark was clear that the point of the obligation of inquiry was to make 
it more likely that compliance and other risk-related information would come to 
the attention of both senior management and the board so that they could carry 
out their fiduciary responsibilities in an informed fashion.36 How to do so was 
left to business judgment, and so once again there is relatively little guidance. 
Although the court does acknowledge that no system can be fail-safe, the 
opinion reads almost as if a competent system, once in place, should ordinarily 
generate reliable information for all interested parties to process. It seems so 
straightforward. 
The reality is messier; compliance is always a struggle. Within the complex 
corporate system, information is diffused among many parties. Often, no one 
person or group will know enough to appreciate the full legal risk, and even if 
they do, they may have incentives to conceal or distort. Work in organization 
psychology emphasizes that these blind spots, blockages, and distortions are not 
necessarily in bad faith (though they certainly are sometimes), but rather are the 
byproduct of routinization that make the truth hard to discern.37 Further 
complication arises from the subjective nature of law and legal risk. Law is often 
full of ambiguity, even when factual questions are posed clearly. Feedback is 
often lacking. As a result, legal risk-related information inside the firm is 
constantly shifting, and subject to wishful thinking. 
Many fascinating issues arise out of this messiness about how managers 
construe legal risk, which scholars in law and the social sciences have been 
studying for some time. For our purposes here, I want to focus on just one issue: 
What is the right internal policy for when management should bring a legal 
compliance matter to the attention of the board? 
One subtle aspect of Caremark comes into play here. The Chancellor 
stressed that no “red flags” had come to the attention of the board that did or 
 
35.  See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 968 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
36.  See id. at 967–68. 
37.  See Malloy, supra note 16, at 457–59; see also Geoffrey P. Miller & Gerald Rosenfeld, 
Intellectual Hazard: How Conceptual Biases in Complex Organizations Contributed to the Crisis of 
2008, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 807, 813–14, 835–36 (2010).  
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should have alerted them of the compliance risk.38 So what is the standard for 
director liability for situations where there were red flags? In two widely noted 
federal courts of appeals decisions applying Delaware law not long after 
Caremark, the courts refused to dismiss cases against the board members 
pending further factual inquiry into what the board members knew and how they 
responded.39 Plaintiffs’ lawyers with Caremark type cases soon were working 
hard to fill their complaints with numerous warning signs that the board should 
have pursued.40 
We need not determine here precisely what the law is with respect to red 
flag cases (especially when the company has a Section 102(b)(7) exculpatory 
clause in its charter to protect directors from duty of care liability).41 All we need 
to see for now is that the moment the board is brought into the compliance risk 
discussion, liability exposure increases to at least a small extent, and Caremark 
itself no longer sets the applicable standard. This shift may be even more 
dramatic under federal law.42 Under the federal securities laws, for example, 
 
38.  See Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971–72. 
39.  See In re Abbott Labs. Derivative S’holders Litig., 325 F.3d 795, 811 (7th Cir. 2003); McCall 
v. Scott, 239 F.3d 808, 826 (6th Cir.) amended on denial of reh’g, 250 F.3d 997 (6th Cir. 2001). The fact 
that these cases were not decided by Delaware courts led plaintiffs to prefer non-Delaware venues for 
Caremark type claims. This is no longer quite so easy due to charter or bylaw provisions mandating 
that derivative claims be brought in Delaware courts. E.g., Verity Winship, Shareholder Litigation by 
Contract, 96 B.U. L. REV. 485 (2016).  
40.  See, e.g., Verified Stockholders’ Derivative Complaint at 36, Westmoreland Cty. Emp. Ret. 
Sys. v. Parkinson, 727 F.3d 719 (7th Cir. 2013) (No. 10-cv-6514) (applying Delaware law). 
41.  In Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006), the Delaware Supreme Court indicated that 
such cases require plaintiffs to show a conscious disregard of the compliance risk in the face of 
whatever “red flags” information came to its attention, which is hardly an easy standard for plaintiffs 
to meet. Id. at 370. And indeed, most such claims fail. See, e.g., In re Qualcomm Inc. FCPA 
Stockholder Derivative Litig., C.A. No. 11152-VCMR, 2017 WL 2608723, at *5 (Del. Ch. June 16, 
2017). But there have been cases where the flags were red enough to permit such an inference, and so 
this remains the route of choice. See, e.g., Westmoreland Cty. Emp. Ret. Sys., 727 F.3d at 729–30 
(applying Delaware law); In re Intuitive Surgical S’holder Derivative Litig., 146 F. Supp. 3d 1106, 1119 
(N.D. Cal. 2015); In re Massey Energy Co., C.A. No. 5430–VCS, 2011 WL 2176479, at *21 (Del. Ch. 
May 31, 2011). For a review and assessment of these red flag cases, see Ezra Wasserman Mitchell, 
Caremark’s Hidden Promise (Aug. 2, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=3012419 [perma: http://perma.cc/UBU5-B7S4]. As a matter of Delaware 
corporate law, many of the Caremark cases just cited were decided based on whether plaintiffs’ failure 
to make demand on the board of directors to bring the suit is excused as futile, which is typically 
resolved by reference to whether the directors face a significant threat of personal liability. That 
inquiry, in turn, is complicated by the fact that most Delaware corporations have adopted charter 
provisions under Section 102(b)(7) that exculpate directors from liability for breach of the duty of care 
absent bad faith. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (West 2018). Indeed, Stone essentially adopts a 
bad faith standard for all Caremark claims. Of course, even with a skeptical judiciary, the pressures to 
settle may be considerable. For a more approving assessment of a Caremark claim once a settlement 
agreement promises to terminate litigation, see In re Pfizer Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation, 780 
F. Supp. 2d 336, 340–42 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).  
42.  There can be substantial disclosure obligations with respect to compliance risks, especially 
for public companies. See Hillary A. Sale & Donald C. Langevoort, “We Believe”: Omnicare, Legal 
Risk Disclosure and Corporate Governance, 66 DUKE L.J. 763, 768 (2016). The extent to which the 
securities laws substitute more aggressively for weak state corporate law fiduciary duty principles is 
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disclosure cases require a showing of scienter, which includes subjective 
recklessness.43 Being brought into the loop provides evidence of this, and also 
triggers a greater possibility of control person liability44 or (for securities firms) 
“duty to supervise” liability.45 
So, board members will not welcome any such escalation. No doubt there 
are circumstances where the legal dangers are so imminent and large that failure 
to escalate would be a clear breach of fiduciary duty on the part of whatever 
senior managers knew of the risks—the duty of “candor inside the corporation” 
about which I have written elsewhere.46 But given the messiness noted earlier, 
many situations will be more ambiguous as to either the probability or the 
magnitude of the risk. There, one can start imagining arguments for putting off 
informing the board for the moment. 
Take, for example, a situation where lawyers at a health care corporation 
authorized a form of contractual arrangement with hospitals and pharmacies. 
There were possible arguments for illegality, but the legal team made the 
judgment that these economically beneficial deals would likely be upheld if 
challenged. Subsequently, however, two things have changed. First, there is 
evidence that certain sales staff have made informal modifications to the 
approved arrangements that might be troubling, the extent of which at this point 
has not yet been determined. Secondly, federal regulators have become notably 
more aggressive in pursuing cases involving marketing practices. Right now, the 
legal team is quietly investigating and has asked the sales department to stop the 
practice of one-off modifications. So, who should know this, and by what means? 
Suppose the company then gets a request from federal regulators inquiring about 
sales and marketing practices, via a letter being sent out to a large number of 
firms in the industry. Or a specific request to discuss such practices with 
enforcement staff from the regulators or the Department of Justice. What about 
a subpoena? 
There is no obvious answer under these varying facts, at least until the 
subpoena. But I can easily imagine this kind of information getting bottled up, 
with potentially unfortunate consequences for the company. This is a sensitive 
matter over which the lawyers want control, and sharing complete information 
 
well documented. See Donald C. Langevoort, Seeking Sunlight in Santa Fe’s Shadow: The SEC’s 
Pursuit of Managerial Accountability, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 449, 450–52 (2001); Robert B. Thompson & 
Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance: Reflections upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. 
REV. 859, 860–61 (2003).  
43.  See JAMES D. COX, ROBERT W. HILLMAN & DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SECURITIES 
REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 706–09 (8th ed. 2017). 
44.  See Marc I. Steinberg & Forrest C. Roberts, Laxity at the Gates: The SEC’s Neglect to 
Enforce Control Person Liability, 11 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 201, 212 (2017) (“Control person liability 
may also be extended to lower level managers and department heads if they exercised the requisite 
amount of control over the primary violator(s).”).  
45.  See 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(E) (2012); James A. Fanto, Surveillant and Counselor: A 
Reorientation in Compliance for Broker-Dealers, 2014 BYU L. REV. 1121, 1143–48. 
46.  Officers who intentionally keep directors in the dark on an important matter are almost 
surely violating fiduciary and agency law responsibilities. See Donald C. Langevoort, Agency Law 
Inside the Corporation: Problems of Candor and Knowledge, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1187, 1195 (2003).  
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with a widening circle of corporate officials necessarily diminishes that control. 
No doubt there is some belief, realistic or not, that the problem can be made to 
go away by distancing the company from the now-riskier practice without 
drawing attention to the matter. In the background—conscious or not—is 
accountability and self-interest. Potentially, the lawyers are to blame either for 
originally providing imprudent legal advice or for failing to understand what was 
really happening and not adjusting their advice in light of new circumstances. 
Human nature is to double down, via what psychologists call “defensive 
bolstering”: increasing one’s commitment to the original decision.47 The lawyers 
may try to find sympathetic outside counsel to concur. All of this may diminish 
the perceived compliance risk and thus understate the actual risk. 
This is a test of character and competence for the lawyers, and there is 
considerable variation in how chief legal officers will perform.48 The Caremark 
related question is whether the board should, as a matter of policy, insist that it 
be brought into matters like these and, if so, how and when. The Caremark 
opinion again says nothing, so that once more it is a matter of good faith business 
judgment. If that is all, then it is probably safe to assume that most boards will 
allow senior management to exercise discretion on what to report up, with the 
implicit understanding that compliance matters are for management to handle 
and only extraordinary circumstances should require board attention. That is not 
entirely unreasonable. Legal compliance is not specifically within the expertise of 
most board members, and there will not necessarily be productive conversations 
in this highly scripted portion of the meeting beyond the exhortation that the 
matter be handled properly. 
Today, however, I doubt that well-advised boards take this position (though 
some probably wish they could).49 The reason, once again, stems mainly from 
pressures from regulators and enforcers at the federal level who have come to 
believe in the value of a stronger board-level presence in compliance.50 The 
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, Committee of Sponsoring Organizations 
of the Treadway Commission principles, and numerous regulatory 
pronouncements seek not only board approval of written policies and 
procedures and key compliance personnel decisions, but also a much more 
interactive involvement that includes reporting lines running from the chief 
compliance officer (and perhaps chief legal officer) directly to the board, 
unfiltered by senior executives.51 While these are rarely so specific as to define 
 
47.  See Philip E. Tetlock et al., Social and Cognitive Strategies for Coping with Accountability: 
Conformity, Complexity, and Bolstering, 57 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 632, 634 (1989).  
48.  See generally BEN W. HEINEMAN, JR., THE INSIDE COUNSEL REVOLUTION: RESOLVING THE 
PARTNER-GUARDIAN TENSION (2016) (describing the increase in the chief legal officer’s importance 
and authority in the corporate sphere over the past twenty years). For an economics perspective on 
these developments, see generally Robert C. Bird et al., The Role of the Chief Legal Officer in 
Corporate Governance, 34 J. CORP. FIN. 1 (2015).  
49.  See Rebecca Walker & Jeff Kaplan, Reporting to the Board on the Compliance and Ethics 
Program, COMPLIANCE & ETHICS PROF., June 2014, at 59, 64–65.  
50.  E.g., Griffith, supra note 6, at 2107–09. 
51.  These are discussed extensively in practice-oriented compliance treatises. E.g., JEFFREY 
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the time frame or materiality threshold for reporting up, the assumption seems 
to be that boards want and need awareness and involvement on an accelerated 
basis as to significant compliance risks. Otherwise, the board will too often be 
the last to know. 
As noted earlier, many scholars and practitioners have criticized federal 
regulators and enforcers for naïvely assuming the virtues of certain corporate 
governance interventions without proof that they really work or are without 
significant costs.52 To them, Caremark’s legacy of minimalism and deference is to 
be celebrated—private ordering will do better at getting compliance 
responsibilities to the right place. Under normal governance conditions, the 
board and the management team will work out an acceptable understanding for 
when compliance matters are to be escalated, a decision which need not be 
second-guessed simply because it tilts heavily toward managerial prerogative. 
What we see here is something of a replay of Section I. The contemporary 
federal perspective seems to be that management is too often inclined to ignore 
or bury compliance warnings and risks and cover up when events pass the 
illegality threshold. Forcing more board-level involvement early on is the only 
practicable alternative at the highest level of the firm, naïve or not. Hence the 
emphasis on real-time interaction not only with senior management but the chief 
legal and compliance officer, supplemented by the positioning of legal and 
compliance personnel in key committees and organization chart checkpoints, so 
that there are more routes by which information can indeed reach the board and 
force it to respond.53 
Nothing guarantees that this will actually happen—sound information flow 
practices on paper are often enough frustrated in practice. But the evidence we 
have on independent director presence does suggest some efficacy in reducing 
firm-level risk and instilling a better attitude toward compliance.54 As corporate 
governance norms continue to move in the direction of board empowerment and 
professionalization, we cannot readily dismiss the possibility that the 
“information forcing” function associated with the burdens and responsibilities 
of added board-level compliance will do some good.55 
This is also consistent with the approach to compliance that focuses on the 
optimal expenditure of resources to avoid social harm, not just harm to the 
corporation and its shareholders. Presumably, independent directors are more 
likely than insiders to accept the legitimacy of societal demands for caution over 
risk-taking when the harms from corporate wrongdoing are spread widely while 
 
KAPLAN & JOSEPH E. MURPHY, COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS AND THE ORGANIZATIONAL SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES (2015 ed.). 
52.  E.g., Cunningham, Deferred Prosecutions, supra note 28. 
53.  For a good survey of these kinds of mandatory reforms, see generally Wulf A. Kaal & 
Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate 
Governance: Evidence from 1995–2013, 70 BUS. LAW. 61 (2015). 
54.  See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, The Social Construction of Sarbanes-Oxley, 105 MICH. L. 
REV. 1817, 1835–36 (2007) (discussing “speed bump” from independent director involvement in risk 
management).  
55.  See Sale & Langevoort, supra note 42, at 787–88. 
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its profits are thoroughly internalized in the form of salaries, bonuses, dividends, 
and stock price appreciation. Or such is the normative expectation, even if not all 
independent directors have yet gotten the message. 
III. WAS CAREMARK INCOMPLETE?: INCENTIVES AND CORPORATE CULTURES 
When Caremark was decided, the neoclassical law and economics 
scholarship was still fairly dominant. Its stress on rationality and market 
efficiency readily led to private ordering solutions to corporate law problems, 
including compliance. If legal sanctions are set correctly, the firm—and those 
whose interests are aligned with the firm—have sufficient incentives to seek to 
avoid violations via an efficient level of internal compliance. If legal sanctions 
are instead set too low or are underenforced, under this view it is not the 
corporation’s problem to solve. 
Much has changed since then. Today, as we have seen, compliance 
expectations are much higher, not tied to the corporation’s narrow self-interest.56 
But scandals continue to grab headlines. Part of the reason for compliance 
failure, no doubt, is because there are still positive returns to wrongdoing 
because of underenforcement.57 But the risks to high-level officials from 
corporate prosecutions and regulatory sanctions go beyond fines and penalties—
stock prices drop, the firm suffers reputational harm, and more. Boards are more 
likely to fire the CEO or subordinates out of anger or frustration, or at least 
reduce their pay.58 There are ample disincentives to corporate illegality, all of 
which should have a robust deterrence effect. 
Perhaps the biggest change in thinking about compliance since Caremark is 
the realization that unhealthy corporate cultures can defeat even the most well-
intentioned preventatives installed by senior management and the board.59 
Indeed, the phrase “culture of compliance” has become standard in describing 
what regulators and enforcers now want to see.60 And this goes well beyond 
anything that can be described in a set of policies and procedures, tonal speeches 
from the top, or written statements of values and ethics. 
We are increasingly coming to see how and why ethical and legal lapses 
occur. Corporate cultures are belief systems—transmitting to loyal, committed 
managers and employees a sense of what is valued, and what is denigrated. They 
help coordinate the activities of numerous stakeholders, an essential task in 
 
56.  See supra Section I. 
57.  See supra notes 25–27.  
58.  See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 987, 1032–40 (2010). 
But see Messod D. Beneish et al., Explaining CEO Retention in Misreporting Firms, 123 J. FIN. ECON. 
512, 515–17 (2017) (explaining that outside directors may not actually be incentivized to make “value-
maximizing decisions”).  
59.  There is now a large body of literature on this. See, e.g., David Hess, Ethical Infrastructures 
and Evidence-Based Corporate Compliance and Ethics Programs: Policy Implications from the 
Empirical Evidence, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 317, 351–59 (2016); Langevoort, Cultures of Compliance, 
supra note 17, at 943–46.  
60.  See Langevoort, Cultures of Compliance, supra note 17, at 940–44. 
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making the complex corporate system function. When corporations are under 
immense competitive pressure to succeed (often driven by shareholders), belief 
systems can become facilitators for what it takes to survive and thrive—the 
grease in the corporate machinery. When circumstances create temptations to 
behave illegally, those beliefs can provide rationalizations that explain why what 
is profitable is also morally acceptable, via what psychologists call “motivated 
inference.”61 Once these kinds of rationalizations take hold, wrongdoing starts to 
happen—first in small steps, then in bigger ones.62 
It is a difficult managerial task to simultaneously drive profits and growth 
while preserving a strong sense of compliance. Typically, the former is directly 
rewarded via raises and promotions and the latter more through exhortations 
and soft praise, if that. Compliance professionals have come to appreciate the 
immensity of the task and the need to prevent the memes that reverberate 
through the corporate culture from enabling dangerous beliefs that stimulate 
legal risk-taking, which is not an easy task. 
Caremark gives no hint of any of this, though that is not a criticism. At the 
time, culture and norms were not central to thinking about governance or 
compliance. Today they are, with regulators and enforcers willing—for better or 
worse—to pass judgment on a company’s ethical climate when deciding whether 
to charge the corporation or just individuals, or how big a fine to seek. The 
lesson is an important one as they work through their growing number of 
compliance-related assignments. As I put it recently in a survey of compliance 
cultures: 
In the end, the most important message about cultures of compliance is 
for corporate leaders and, especially, for boards of directors. It is much 
too easy to look around and see good people working hard at difficult 
jobs and assume that a good compliance culture exists simply because 
everyone has been warned of the damage that can come from getting 
caught doing wrong. Or worse, to assume that an observable 
abundance of intensity, loyalty and creativity are signs that all is 
good.63 
We have seen wrongdoing emerge from within the most celebrated of 
companies, often when—and perhaps because—boards engaged in their own 
sort of motivated inference, failing to appreciate that it was time to turn down 
internal corporate temperature a bit before things got out of control. 
One small irony, however, comes from Caremark’s curt dismissal of 
Graham’s warning against fiduciary duty leading to intracorporate espionage.64 
Today, those fears are very much still with us, all the more so as technology 
creates surveillance tools unimaginable in 1996, much less 1963. Surveillance 
 
61.  See, e.g., Francesca Gino et al., Motivated Bayesians: Feeling Moral While Acting 
Egotistically, 30 J. ECON. PERSP. 189, 191–95 (2016). 
62.  See, e.g., John M. Darley, The Cognitive and Social Psychology of Contagious 
Organizational Corruption, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1177, 1177–81 (2005) (discussing the erosion of an 
organization’s commitment to compliance).  
63.  Langevoort, Cultures of Compliance, supra note 17, at 977 (footnote omitted).  
64.  See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 969–70 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
  
2018] CAREMARK AND COMPLIANCE 741 
 
intensity, as many have pointed out, may be effective at promoting command 
and control, but comes at a cost in terms of a culture of trust and integrity that is 
hard to measure but very much worth worrying about.65 
CONCLUSION 
Caremark’s legacy today takes two forms. It remains part of the canon of 
authorities regularly cited as the impetus to taking compliance seriously in 
boardrooms and executive suites, and it still generates a steady flow of litigation, 
if not significant recoveries, by shareholders of companies that suffered the 
trauma of a compliance failure. But it is also cited and embraced by critics of the 
federal presence who see unchecked costs to the obsession with compliance and 
wish to return to more business judgment deference to boards and managers, not 
federal bureaucrats, on how best to design and implement compliance systems. 
Chancellor Allen was no ideologue, and he understood that he was 
addressing only the shareholder litigation piece of the far larger compliance 
puzzle. In extrajudicial writings, he was sensitive to the biases and distorted 
incentives that plague high-stakes corporate decisionmaking, hoping that 
independent lawyers, directors, and others understood the need to step up 
regardless of the diminished liability threat.66 Those thoughts have even more 
resonance today, as the short-term market pressures on corporations have grown 
all the more intense.67 They are strongly felt in the boardroom. But there are 
also countervailing pressures in the direction of “publicness”: the societal 
expectations that economically powerful entities have an obligation to temper 
the risks they take when the harms from bad decisions are felt outside corporate 
boundaries. Compliance is a crucial part of this, which the Chancellor 
understood and wanted to promote as much as he could within the restrictive 
confines of the case before him. To be clear, I do not think that Caremark was 
misleading, naïve, or incomplete. The Chancellor knew that if boards failed to 
become more sophisticated and sensitive to doing this well—the cultural part as 
well as the policies and procedures—external pressures would continue to grow 
 
65.  Heavy monitoring itself produces reactance, frustrating compliance. Inculcating a sense of 
trust is necessary for optimal behavior, yet trust will sometimes be abused. See Donald C. Langevoort, 
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REV. 71, 72; Gary R. Weaver, Encouraging Ethics in Organizations: A Review of Some Key Research 
Findings, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 293, 297 (2014); see also Fanto, supra note 45, at 1123–24; Todd 
Haugh, The Criminalization of Compliance, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1215, 1218–23 (2017); Scott 
Killingsworth, Behavioral Ethics: From Nudges to Norms, ETHIKOS, Jan.–Feb. 2017, at 1, 1–5; Milton 
C. Regan, Jr., Moral Intuitions and Organizational Culture, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 941, 981–82 (2007).  
66.  See generally, e.g., William T. Allen, Corporate Governance and a Business Lawyer’s Duty of 
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67.  Such market pressures include activist investors, whose influence does not appear to be 
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Jr., Preserving the Corporate Superego in a Time of Stress: An Essay on Ethics and Economics, 33 
OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 221, 231–34 (2017); Jillian Popadak, A Corporate Culture Channel: How 
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without regard to cost or efficiency. That is even more so today. 
